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MffANAGEMENT of low level radioactive waste has become a complicated
subject, less because of technical difficulties than because of the ex-
traordinary sociopolitical ramifications that have proliferated during the past
decade. It has often been said that the problems associated with radioactive
waste management are less than 10% technical and more than 90% public
relations.
THE STANDARDS OF PERMISSIBLE RADIATION EXPOSURE
Assurance of safe management of radioactive material requires sufficient
knowledge of the biological effects of radiation to permit establishment of
socially acceptable standards of permissible exposure. Radiation protection
has received worldwide attention for many decades and is far more devel-
oped, both scientifically and philosophically, than environmental toxicology
generally. In a large measure this is due to the work of international and
national bodies concerned with radiation protection. The International Com-
mission on Radiological Protection was formed exactly 60 years ago, in 1928.
One year later the National Council on Radiation Protection and Measure-
ments was formed in the United States. In 1955 the General Assembly of the
United Nations established the U.N. Scientific Committee on the Biological
Effects of Atomic Radiation, and that organization has been remarkably
effective in gathering information from all over the world and assembling it in
reports that are issued periodically and are classics in international scientific
collaboration. No organizations comparable to these are concerned with the
health effects of the chemicals to which we are exposed.
The establishment of radiation protection standards is complicated by the
assumption that a threshold does not exist for the carcinogenic and genetic
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effects of exposure.l If a threshold did exist, as is true for the chemical
toxicity of many substances, safety could be assured by setting the permiss-
ible dose below the threshold, the definition of which requires scientfic judge-
ment. However, once it is assumed that a threshold does not exist, the
question is no longer "What is the safe dose," but "How safe is safe." The
latter question cannot be answered by scientists alone. The acceptability of
risk requires a social rather than a scientific judgement.
If a threshold does not exist, no dose level assures absolute safety. Any
exposure, however slight, increases the probability that cancer or genetic
effects may develop. The probabilities of such effects at doses of the order of
those to which the public is exposed from the operation of low level radioac-
tive waste facilities are finite, though vanishingly small. Therefore, it must be
assumed that the risks are likewise finite, though vanishingly small. This
reasoning is inherent in the assumption of a linear dose-response relationship,
and is the basis of the unwillingness of the public to accept any additional
radiation exposure above the natural background despite the fact that the
background normally varies considerably, and the "permissible" exposures
are well within its range of normal variability.
The regulatory agencies and bodies such as the International Commission
on Radiological Protection and National Council on Radiation Protection that
provide basic guidance to them have solved this problem by setting the
allowable radiation exposures at levels that, at a maximum, will result in risks
to the workers or to the general population no greater than the risks accepted
from other industrial or commercial activities generally considered to be safe.
The Environmental Protection Agency and Nuclear Regulatory Commission
have established the offsite dose limitation at 25 mrem/y. The actual doses
received by people living near low level nuclear waste facilities has actually
been very much lower.
EARLY HISTORY OF Low LEVEL
RADIOACTIVE WASTE MANAGEMENT
Until about 1960 almost all low level waste was generated in facilities
owned by the federal government, and waste repositories were located at or
near them. Since there were no commercially operated repositories to accom-
modate the relatively small volume of waste then being generated by the
private sector, the government also allowed those facilities to be used for
wastes produced at biomedical institutions and research laboratories. There
were as yet no privately owned nuclear power plants. At that time it was also
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permissible to dispose of wastes into the marine environment under licenses
issued by the Atomic Energy Commission, but no such licenses were issued
after 1960 and the method was discontinued completely after 1970, by which
time commercial shallow land burial services had become available.2
In 1960 the decision was made that private waste generators would no
longer be allowed to use the government facilities, and that commercial
companies would be expected to provide disposal services under license from
the Atomic Energy Commission. The first such facility began operation in
Beatty, Nevada, in 1962, and by 1971 six commercial facilities were in oper-
ation, using the method of shallow land burial.
It was not long before operating deficiencies were reported at all the com-
mercial burial grounds. Some shipments were arriving improperly packaged.
Trenches were not properly designed, and surface subsidence created what
became known as the "bathtub effect" because rainwater accumulated in the
depressions and infiltrated the stored wastes. At one site, in Beatty, Nevada,
workers at the site were pilfering contaminated tools and equipment, which
were eventually recovered.
All of these developments indicated management deficiencies that required
correction, but the subject received far more attention from the media and
political circles than was warranted by the facts. It is important to emphasize
that in no case was there significant exposure of either the workers at the sites
or people living in the environs. Only at one site was there a measurable dose
to any member of the public: that was at Maxey Flats, Kentucky, and was less
than 3 mrem per year. It helps to put this figure into perspective to note that
because of differences in the local geology the annual dose received from
natural radiation on the island of Manhattan is about 15 mrem per year higher
than that received across the river in the borough of Queens. Exposure of the
public at Maxey Flats was only a small fraction of the dose received from
natural sources of radiation and a small fraction of the annual dose permitted
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission and other regulatory agencies.
OPTIONS FOR DISPOSAL OF Low LEVEL WASTE
At the present time three options are available for disposal of low level
radioactive wastes: on-site decay, incineration, and near surface burial.
Decay is a logical way to deal with short-lived nuclides used in biomedical
facilities. 1-131, with a half-life of 8 days, 14 day P-32, and 80 day S-35 need
not be shipped offsite if storage space is available to allow for decay. At
nuclear power plants, one of the principal waste nuclides is Cobalt-60, with a
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half-life of about five years. Storage of wastes in which Co-60 is initially the
predominant nuclide is frequently feasible for a few decades at the power
plant.
Two long-lived radionuclides, Tritium (H-3) and C-14, are widely used in
biomedical institutions, and regulations permit combustible wastes contain-
ing these nuclides to be incinerated. Both H-3 and C-14 are produced natu-
rally in the atmosphere by cosmic ray interactions, and the amounts that could
be released to the environment by biomedical facilities would be trivial
compared to that which already exists. Unfortunately, in some communities
local rules prohibit this practice. It is not easy to understand why this is so. An
incinerator that is able to safely incinerate pathological wastes should be more
than adequate for the safe incineration of wastes containing C-14 and H-3.
In the public mind, the practice of near surface burial is frequently con-
fused with land-filling. Landfills have been widely used for disposal of mu-
nicipal and commercial wastes, and involve dumping of refuse into lowlands.
The refuse is uncontained. Landfills are unsightly, frequently odoriferous,
and are generally considered nuisances. In shallow land burial, the low level
radioactive wastes are delivered to the disposal site in containers that are
subject to strict design requirements, which depend on the level of radioac-
tivity. The wastes are stacked in trenches typically 1,000 feet long, 100 feet
wide, and 20 feet deep. When the trenches are filled to a predetermined
height, contents are covered with soil, and the filled trench is graded. There
should then be little or no radiation exposure on the surface of the trench
above that received from natural radioactivity.
REPOSITORY DESIGN AND OPERATING CRITERIA
The potential danger to the public from operation of near surface burial
facilities is that ground water may become contaminated by leaching of the
wastes. The physical form in which the wastes are received and the manner in
which they are packaged preclude the possibility of airborne radioactivity
once the wastes are interred. There is no credible scenario by which the
release of airborne material could result in significant exposure. There have
been several million shipments of low level wastes during the past 40 years,
and there have been a number of accidents both during handling of the
packages and during highway transportation, but there were very few cases in
which the packages were breached, and in no case was there exposure of the
public.
Site selection, operation, and even closure and postoperational mainte-
nance of the repository are regulated by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
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in accordance with the requirments specified in Part 61 of Title 10 of the Code
of Federal Regulations (1OCFR61). Some of the states, including New York,
have been delegated responsibility for assuring the safety of most of the uses
of radioactive materials, including management of the low level radioactive
waste facilities within their boundaries. Under the terms of the agreements,
states are required to adopt regulations at least as strict as those promulgated
by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. Some states have adopted require-
ments stricter than those of the Commission, a subject to which I shall return
later.
The basic objective of Part 61 is that the low level radioactive waste
disposal facility should be sited, designed, operated, closed, and controlled
after closure so that reasonable assurance exists that exposure of humans will
be within the officially established limits. The term "reasonable assurance"
is used in many regulations and should be taken as an acknowledgement that
it can never be guaranteed with absolute certainty that the limits will not be
exceeded. This is especially true in situations where the anticipated doses
must be estimated before the facility has completed its life and, as in the case
of most facilities, even before their construction has been completed. How-
ever, models used to estimate expected exposures are conservative, and the
doses received in all cases with which I am familiar have been lower, often by
orders of magnitude, than the estimated doses. This is illustrated by the
histories of the six sites that have operated in the United States. It is important
to remember that Part 61 was not issued until 1980, by which time the
presently existing facilities had been in operation for up to 18 years. They
were not subject to the rigid site selection, packaging, and operating pro-
cedures that are now specified in Part 61, but, despite the operating deficien-
cies noted above, there has been no significant exposure of the public.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission regulations for control of low level radio-
active waste repositories were published in 1980 after a lengthy period of
public comment. The environmental impact statement filed by The Commis-
sion3 in compliance with the requirements of the National Environmental
Policy Act was a document of several volumes in which many scenarios were
analyzed to estimate doses likely to be received by the public. Since ground
water is the vehicle by which the public is most likely to be exposed, this
pathway is of special interest. However, in the environmental impact state-
ment all exposure pathways were considered, including air, soil, ground
water, surface water, plant uptake, and even exhumation by burrowing ani-
mals. For a site in the eastern United States it was estimated that the annual
whole body dose to people affected by the repository would be 0.003 mrem.
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This is the dose a person normally receives in a few minutes from normal
exposure to natural radioactivity, which is about 100 mrem per year to most
organs of the body, but averages 2,400 mrem per year to the bronchial
epithelium due to radon in the atmosphere.4 The estimated annual dose
received from a nearby repository is also a small fraction of the 25 mrem
whole body dose permitted for the public. Since the models used by the
Commission to estimate dose commitments usually result in overestimates,
the most likely conclusion is that there will be no exposure to the public. This
conclusion is supported by the fact that there was so little exposure from the
facilities built and operated according to the less stringent requirements that
existed prior to publication of Part 61.
The main provisions of the regulations that pertain to radiological safety
are the following: The annual dose to the members of the public must not
exceed 25 mrem to the whole body, 75 mrem to the thyroid, and 25 mrem to
any other organ. The site shall be capable of being characterized, modeled,
analyzed, and monitored, which means that hydrogeological features can be
described in quantitative terms. The direction and rates of movement of
radionuclides leached from the wastes should be predictable. This is not
possible at some sites. For example, if the wastes were to be placed in
fractured bedrock, the path taken by seepage might be indeterminate. Its
movement would be difficult. At the other extreme, if the wastes were to be
placed in a clay bed with homogeneous properties, the movement of ground
water could be well described, the exchange capacity of the clay would be
well known, and the rates of movement of the individual nuclides would be
predictable as a function of time. Design, operation, and closure of of the
facility must ensure protection of individuals who inadvertently intrude into
the site at any time after institutional controls over the disposal site are
removed. The site must be well drained and not subject to ponding or flood-
ing. The upstream drainage area must be minimized to avoid erosion of the
site. The ground water must be of sufficient depth to prevent it from seeping
into the repository. Voids between the packages of wastes must be filled to
avoid subsidence. This is to avoid the "bathtub effect" discussed earlier.
Liquid wastes must be solidified or packaged in sufficient suitable material to
absorb twice the volume of the liquid. Solid waste shall contain less than 1%
free standing noncorrosive liquid. Wastes must be noncorrosive, and be
incapable of causing fire or explosion. They must also be structurally stable
under the loads to be borne in storage.
There are innumerable additional requirements, among which is that the
facility must be located on land owned by either the state or federal govern-
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ments. Finally, there must be assurance of continuity of institutional control,
including radiological monitoring, for 100 years after closure of the site.
However, regulations state that institutional controls should not be relied
upon after 100 years because by that time the potential risks will be reduced
by radioactive decay to such an extent that further surveillance should no
longer be necessary.
An important feature of the regulations is how wastes are classified. The
relative hazard from a radionuclide released into the environment depends on
its half-life, physical decay scheme, and its geochemical and biological prop-
erties. For example, tritium is the least hazardous of the radionuclides be-
cause it emits a very soft beta particle (0.018 Mev), does not concentrate
significantly in any parts of the biosphere, and when absorbed into the human
body is excreted rapidly (half-life in humans is about 10 days). In contrast,
Strontium-90 emits a strong beta particle (more than 2 Mev) and tends to
concentrate in the skeleton, from which it is eliminated very slowly with a
half-life of about 27 years. The net effect of these variables is on the allow-
able intake of the various nuclides in drinking water, which are given in the
table. It is seen that the allowable concentration for tritium is 3,000 times that
allowed for Sr-90.
ANNUAL LIMITS FOR INGESTION OF
CERTAIN RADIONUCLIDES






Part 61 classifies low level radioactive waste into three classes, A, B, and
C, the packaging and disposal requirements for which are progressively more
severe. The class A wastes consist generally of the kinds of slightly contami-
nated trash generated at nuclear reactors and laboratories, and is exempt from
most of the stability requirements applicable to other wastes. The class A
wastes will have decayed to harmless levels during the 100 period of institu-
tional control. Class B and C wastes must be packaged in containers that will
retain their integrity for at least 300 years. There are specified maximum
amounts of the more labile nuclides that may be stored for these two classes of
wastes.
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The hazardous characteristics of both A and B wastes will have diminished
sufficiently after the 100 year period of institutional control thereafter to
preclude danger to inadvertent intruders. Wastes that will continue to present
a danger to intruders after 100 years are called Class C wastes, and must be
emplaced at greater depths, or covered by massive concrete barriers to mini-
mize the possibility of inadvertent intrusion. The barriers must retain their
integrity for at least 500 years. If the wastes are expected to continue to
present a hazard to an intruder after 500 years they are not considered eligible
for near surface burial, are called "Greater then Class C wastes," and must
be shipped for disposal at a designated government facility. Such wastes are
not disposed of in commercial facilities.
THE 1980 Low LEVEL RADIOACTIVE WASTE POLICY ACT
By 1980 there were only three commercially operated low level radioactive
waste repositories, of which only one, at Barnwell, South Carolina, was
located in the Eastern part of the country. A crisis was impending because the
three state governments were taking actions that would exclude wastes from
being imported across their boundaries. Why the states took such drastic
actions is not readily apparent, but seems to be related to reluctance to be
known as major sites for the disposal of radioactive refuse. Because of the
serious implications of the matter, in 1980 the Congress passed the Low
Level Radioactive Waste Policy Act, which established as national policy
that each state is responsible for providing facilities for the disposal of waste
generated by civilian activities within its borders. The Act also suggested that
such facilities could be best provided by regional arrangements, or compacts.
The three existing repositories, at Barnwell, Beatty, and Hanford, were
required to accept wastes from outside their borders until January 1, 1986.
Although the states moved rapidly to form and to ratify regional arrange-
ments, it soon became clear that they could not meet the 1986 deadline, and in
1985 the Congress amended the Act to require the three existing sites to
remain open for an additional eight years, and other states were required to
meet milestones that would result in operation of regional facilities by 1993.
Various regional arrangements have now been largely completed. In the
Southeast eight states have formed a compact and have selected North Caro-
lina to be the host state for the 20 year period beginning in 1993. At the end of
that time another state will be selected to serve as the host state for the next 20
year period. The various states have opted to comply with the Act in different
ways. New York has decided to proceed on its own, without associating with
other states.
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SOME CONCLUDING THOUGHTS ABOUT THE CURRENT SITUATION
The various states and compacts are currently selecting sites for the re-
quired facilities, and many of them will soon apply for licenses and begin
construction. From the purely technical point of view, the projects should be
relatively simple, but their management is complicated greatly by an unusu-
ally complex maze of political and legal obstacles. These arise basically from
the gap that exists between the actual and perceived risks associated with low
level radioactive waste facilities. This troublesome aspect of waste manage-
ment will be discussed by others in the course of this symposium, but I would
like to comment briefly on the impact of the gap in understanding on the
management of such waste.
IOCFR61 is a thoroughly considered regulation crafted by skilled hands
after ample opportunity for comments and suggestions from the public. How-
ever, there is a tendency, known as "ratchetting" these days, for local state
governments to require features that go beyond the requirements of Part 61. A
particularly onerous requirement adopted by many states in response to pub-
lic pressure is that the facility cannot rely on the integrity of the packages and
the characteristics of the soil to retain the wastes, but must provide "engi-
neered barriers" for additional protection. Experience in the field during the
past 40 years and thorough study of the problem by the methods of environ-
mental impact analysis have shown that if the site is properly selected there is
no need for additional protection. Yet in some states the requirement for
engineered barriers has been enacted into law. It would at first seem as though
this is a simple enough concession to make if it will eliminate the public
concerns. However, geochemists know more about the long-term protective
characteristics of clay than civil engineers know about the long-term perfor-
mance of concrete. Engineered barriers are required by law in one state with
which I am familiar, but the law also requires that the site and facility should
be able to meet the performance requirements of 1OCFR20. It is as though a
man doesn't trust his perfectly secure trousers belt and wears suspenders as
well! It is my understanding that all of the facilities being built in the eastern
United States will be provided with engineered barriers.
To a public health specialist this is a great extravagance. It has been
reported that one death from cervical cancer can be prevented by an average
expenditure of $25,000, and that deaths from smoke inhalation could be
prevented at an average cost of $40,000 by a requirement that all bedrooms be
equipped with smoke detectors. (These figures are a bit out of date and the
unit costs may now be higher as a result of inflation, but the point I am making
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will not be affected). Many other examples could be cited to illustrate that
premature deaths can be prevented at relatively modest cost.5,6
However, in activities associated with modem technology, society is will-
ing to spend far greater amounts of money to avoid premature death. For
example, in the control of chemical carcinogens it has been estimated that the
unit costs may be as high as hundreds of millions of dollars. Even such costs
are dwarfed by the cost-benefit ratios of measures being taken to provide
additional protection from the effects of low level radioactive waste facilities.
The lowest estimate that has come to my attention of the cost of providing
engineered safeguards is about $100 million over the life of the facility. If we
take as the objective of the additional safeguards that it will fully eliminate the
estimated dose of 0.003 mrem per year to 100 persons who reside near the
facility for 50 years and use a risk coefficient oftwo cases of fatal cancer from
a collective dose of 10,000 person-rem, the cost per cancer averted comes to
at least tens of trillions of dollars. The scientific community should speak out
against such nonsense! The main problem seems to be the great gap that exists
between the actual risks from low level radioactive waste disposal facilities
and the risks as perceived by the public. That important aspect of the matter
will be discussed by others at this Symposium.
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